A High Court test case will decide whether WhatsApp messages are legally binding, after a husband sent a message to his wife telling her he would sign over his share of the family home as part of their divorce settlement. Hsiao Mei-Lin claims the WhatsApp from her ex-husband, Icelandic financier Audun Mar Gudmundsson, is legally binding. But trustees administering a bankruptcy petition against Gudmundsson’s claim otherwise, and say his share of the property belongs to the estate. Lucia Mills, legal director in the property disputes team at Birketts, examines the legal hurdles and potential implications for digital signatures.
The case of Ms Lin and her former husband, Mr Gudmundsson, may prove significant for practitioners advising on property ownership disputes. The case concerns a £1.5 million family home in North London, which was subject to a divorce settlement and Mr Gudmundsson’s bankruptcy, and raises difficult questions about the legal effect of informal digital communications on beneficial interests in land.
Under the financial remedy order made in the divorce proceedings, Ms Lin was awarded the former matrimonial home. However, one week before judgment was handed down, Mr Gudmundsson was declared bankrupt. That fact was not disclosed to the Family Court prior to the making of the order. Consequently, despite the terms of the divorce settlement, the High Court held that the trustee in bankruptcy retained Mr Gudmundsson’s half share in the property. Ms Lin therefore faces the prospect of losing the family home once the children attain the age of 18.
Ms Lin now seeks to argue that her former husband had already disposed of his beneficial interest in the property prior to the bankruptcy, such that it could not vest in the trustee. Central to her case is a series of WhatsApp messages exchanged between the parties, and in particular the following message from Mr Gudmundsson:
“I suggest that the responsibility for taking care of the kids goes to u 100%, then I can sign over my share of southcote road to u without any complications as I don’t need any accommodation in London.
“Please let me know that u r happy with this and we can then close the financial part of the divorce this week.”
The legal hurdle Ms Lin faces is section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which requires that any disposition of an equitable interest in land must be “in writing” and “signed” by the person disposing of it. Traditionally, compliance is achieved by way of a formal transfer or deed, duly signed, witnessed and registered at HM Land Registry. However, over time, the courts have been prepared to look beyond formal documentation and consider whether less orthodox communications can satisfy the statutory requirements.
That trend was most notably illustrated in Hudson v Hathway [2022] EWCA Civ 1648, where the Court of Appeal held that an email exchange was sufficient to dispose of a beneficial interest. In that case, the court found that Hudson’s emails met the requirements of section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925, as the emails were considered ‘in writing’ under the Interpretation Act 1978, and the inclusion of the sender’s typed name (“Lee”) was held to constitute a valid signature. At the time, many practitioners speculated that the reasoning could extend to other digital platforms, including instant messaging services such as WhatsApp.
The present case invites the court to test those boundaries further. Unlike the emails in Hudson, the WhatsApp message relied on by Ms Lin is not signed at all. It did not conclude with Mr Gudmundsson’s name or any conventional sign-off. The only identifying feature is his name displayed at the top of the message, which was automatically generated by Ms Lin’s phone and the WhatsApp platform itself. Whether that is sufficient to amount to a “signature” within the meaning of section 53(1)(c) remains a novel and contentious issue.
Beyond formality, the court must also grapple with questions of intention. In domestic contexts, there is a well-established presumption that parties do not intend to create legal relations. While that presumption is rebuttable, the court will have to decide whether Mr Gudmundsson intended the message to have immediate legal effect, or whether it was merely a proposal subject to further agreement and formalisation by solicitors as part of the wider divorce settlement.
Whatever the outcome, the case serves as a salutary reminder of the risks inherent in informal communications concerning property and financial arrangements. If Ms Lin is successful, practitioners may reasonably be concerned that parties will become reluctant to engage in direct negotiations for fear of inadvertently creating binding legal consequences without advice. Clients should be warned that informal language, particularly in digital correspondence, may carry formal and irreversible effects.
The case has the potential to shape the courts’ approach to digital signatures and informal messaging in property disputes and illustrates the law’s ongoing struggle to adapt traditional concepts of formality and intention to modern methods of communication. As patterns of ownership and communication evolve, so too must the legal standards by which they are judged.
About the author
Lucia Mills is a legal director in the property disputes team at Birketts. Specialising in applications under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA), her work focuses on resolving trusts of land disputes and cohabitation disputes. Her expertise includes the establishment and quantification of beneficial interests in property under TOLATA, whether these interests arise from express, constructive, or resulting trusts, and whether the property is solely or jointly owned. Lucia also deals with claims under proprietary estoppel and advises parties on their options following a separation which can often lead to a forced sale or a buyout. She has dealt with many cases involving complex equitable accounts to include occupation rent claims. Lucia also advises on potential applications under and Schedule 1 of Children Act 1989 and third parties involved in divorce proceedings.
